NewGeography.com blogs

Using EDS suspension developed in Germany with Halbach array magnets, mini-maglev jitneys are a new technology that could transform congested corridors of Orlando. The train car itself is small – only 8’ wide x 30’ long – and holds approximately 12 sitting people and 8 or 9 standing people. But the ability of the train to zip along the centerline of crowded arteries like 17-92 and 50, and future tracks along secondary strips within the region, could give people a new way to travel.

Silent, with no moving parts, the electrodynamic maglev can ride along a guideway buried in the center of the road. Depressions for the jitney’s levitation magnets are shallow enough to drive over, making maglev tracks no more an obstacle than railroad crossings. Within cities like Portland, electric streetcars with clicking and buzzing pantographs are the norm, and drivers, pedestrians, bikers, and buses all coexist within a narrow public street. Here in Orlando, the pantograph, exposed to hurricanes, would be a liability, and the maglev instead presents a safer, more reliable transit system of the future.

How does it work? The train rests on tires at each stop, but as it accelerates past walking speed, powerful permanent magnets in the chassis lift it up off the guideway. Solid magnets in the guideway present an opposing force (really, the same pole is offered to the jitney’s undercarriage, pushing it forward and away). Electric power is present only immediately underneath the vehicle’s footprint, making the guideway a benign, inert force within the busy roadways in the city.

The car itself is a “smart” car, with no driver needed – a GPS-controlled computer stops and starts the car, with motion detectors delaying it briefly while passengers get on and off. As the car glides along, the photovoltaic roof powers the car’s air conditioners, lights, wi-fi system, and other devices. If the car breaks down, it simply comes to rest on its wheels, and it can be towed to safety within minutes.

But maglev technology, already in use for decades in France, Germany, Japan, and China, is already outstripping older technology in safety and reliability. These older systems went for speed, making for very large, heavy trains travelling in excess of 300 mph.

The mini-maglev, by contrast, will feature headways within minutes of each other – if you miss one, another will be along in 10 minutes or less in peak times. Bike racks in front and back allow you mobility once you reach your stop, and since they are designed for short trips, the cars are designed for standing as well as seated passengers. A full 360◦ glazed car will allow views in and out – making the trip pleasant, safe, and enjoyable.

Whispering along at conventional traffic speeds, mini-maglevs offer the busy commuter an option that is convenient, reliable, and beautiful. These jitneys are life-enhancing features that will set Orlando apart from other cities in terms of sense-of-place. Neither a 19th century train nor a 20th century bus, the mini-maglev borrows a transportation concept from the islands – the jitney – and recognizes our region’s multipolar, fine-grained circulation system already in place. Instead of fighting this system with a heavy steel-wheel rail system on 19th century rails like Sunrail, it simply enhances existing corridors.

Jitneys roam many Caribbean islands, gathering workers around the villages and transporting them into the resorts and the towns in packets of 10 or 15 passengers a vehicle. Frequent stops make them more like large-scale vanpools rather than small-scale buses, and they act as the connective tissue among the spread-out villages and settlements in which islanders dwell.

The spirit of the jitney is transformed by 21st century technology into a transit system serving the needs of a spread-out, dense region like Orlando. Let’s face it: while driving, we are highly tempted to chat on the telephone, text, or do many other things other than drive. Waiting at red lights or stopped in traffic jams, the pleasure that once was driving has now receded all too frequently in favor of frustration, anger, and fatigue. We sense the lost time behind the wheel, seeking to make up for some of it with mobile communication, but this has an external price to pay: the driver ahead misses the green light because he is texting, making your trip longer as well.

In the mini-maglev future, the distance and time are unchanged; what has changed is your freedom while you travel. Getting there will be fun again, and arriving in a mini-maglev jitney will be the new way to make an entrance.

Electronic Jitney farecards will make paying for the ride super-easy, and if you have any question about the route, timetable, or stops, fear not: your smart phone app will show you where you are going, where you want to get off closest to your stop, and map out how to get there from here. It will also helpfully show you what is coming up along your path: A library, your friend, a Starbucks…

And, for frequent riders, a feature long desired by mass transit commuters worldwide: on-call jitneys. Frequent riders will be able to electronically request a jitney at their desired stops, making these computer-controlled cars come to you. Getting off work late no longer means a lengthy nighttime wait for a taxi, or the next bus not due for another hour. You can request the car, and the farecard will give you back a message instructing you when and where to show up. With computer-controlled routing, mass transit is now more individually customizable than ever.

The mini-maglev jitney, combined with personal electronic systems, transforms mass transit from a Victorian burden on cities into a sexy, hip way to get where you need to go.

No sooner had Florida Gov. Rick Scott rejected federal funding for the Tampa to Orlando high-speed rail line, than proponents both in Washington and Tallahassee set about to find ways to circumvent his decision. While an approach has not been finalized, a frequently suggested alternative is to grant the federal money to a local government, such as a city or county or even to a transit agency.

Eliminating State Taxpayer Risks, Creating Local? In an announcing his decision, Governor Scott cited the substantial risks to Florida taxpayers from cost overruns, the ongoing obligation under the federal grant to subsidize operations and the fact that under certain circumstances Florida might even have to repay the $2.4 billion in federal grants. Any local government accepting the federal money would expose itself to the financial risks from which Florida taxpayers have been exempted by Governor Scott's action.

None of these risks is an idle threat.

(1) Capital Cost Overruns: Based upon the international experience, the eventual construction cost overruns for the Tampa to Orlando high-speed rail line could easily run to $3 billion, more than doubling the price of the project (Note on Extent of Taxpayer Liability, below). In light of the recently reported 50 percent increase in California high-speed rail construction costs, even the $3 billion estimate could turn out to be conservative. The problem is that any local federal grant recipient (city, county or transit district) would be responsible for these cost overruns.

(2) Ongoing Operating Subsidies: The ridership projections for the Tampa to Orlando high-speed rail line are exceedingly optimistic. This could well lead to a situation in which substantial subsidies are necessary to operate the trains, despite claims of proponents to the contrary. These subsidies would be the responsibility of any city, county or transit district that becomes a grant recipient.

(3) Federal Pay-Back: If, for any reason, the eventual high-speed rail service levels are not sufficiently high because of lower than projected ridership or if service is canceled, any city, county or transit district could be required to return the $2.4 billion in federal grants. Florida is already paying millions annually for a similar "transgression." In 2009, service reductions on the Tri-Rail Commuter Rail System in the Miami area led the Obama Administration's Department of Transportation to demand repayment of one quarter billion dollars in grants. Tri-Rail was saved from this obligation only by a multimillion dollar Tallahassee bailout. Proponents have claimed that this rail obligation could be negotiated away for high-speed rail. Why was the Tri-Rail obligation not negotiated away in 2009?

By rejecting the federal funding, Gov. Scott has inoculated Florida taxpayers against these risks.

However, there would be no inoculation for any local jurisdiction whose commissioners or city council accepted the expensive "gift" of federal funding for the high speed rail line. Their taxpayers would have to pay. The very financial viability of any such jurisdiction could be at risk.

The Risk Could Revert to State Taxpayers: Eventually, the risk could be again be visited upon state taxpayers as a local government facing virtual bankruptcy would doubtless seek a bailout in Tallahassee, repeating the Tri-Rail experience, though much more expensively. Moreover, canceling a half built project, which might be tempting as costs escalate above projections, would simply not be viable. The political pressure to complete the project, at whatever cost, could prove to be overwhelming.

Delusions About Private Responsibility for Cost Overruns: Some proponents claim that these huge obligations can be somehow transferred to the private builder/operator that is selected for the project. Nothing like this has ever happened in public-private partnerships around the world, and for good reason. Companies do not stash away billions of dollars for cost overruns.

Further, the winning bidder will be a consortium of other companies, established with limited liability by larger companies. The consortium would abandon a project it could not afford sooner rather than later. Any bankruptcy of the builder/operator would be limited to the consortium and would not extend to the parent companies, leaving the local taxpayers to pay.

There is no escaping the fact that the taxpayers of any city or county accepting the federal money would be providing financial guarantees to an international infrastructure industry that has left a "train" of huge and unanticipated financial obligations around the world in its wake (Note on Cost Escalation, below).

Believing in Santa Claus? Public officials, and most recently Orlando Mayor Teresa Jacobs, have indicated support for high-speed rail if private and federal funds pay for it, and state and local taxpayers aren't exposed to liability. This is a wise position, but untenable. Expect Santa Claus to arrive in the midst of a Florida summer before that, with a sleigh full of billions.

----

Note on Extent of Taxpayer Liability: This $3 billion is in addition to the already committed $280 million of taxpayer funding. Proponents of the high-speed rail line have assumed that the $280 million would be the limit of taxpayer obligations. As this article shows, the $280 million could be a "drop in the bucket" compared to the likely eventual taxpayer liability.

Note on Cost Escalation: An international team of researchers led by Oxford University Professor Bent Flyvbjerg has found in Megaprojects and Risks: An Anatomy of Ambitionthat similar projects routinely cost far more than taxpayers and other funders are told. They also attract fewer riders and generate less revenue (which can require operating subsidies). The Flyvbjerg team implies that these "lowball" (our term) projections are not accidental but all are the result of "strategic misrepresentation," (their term) which project promoters employ to increase the potential that projects will be approved. The researchers also refer to "strategic misrepresentation" as "lying," which is an exceedingly strong term for academic research and is reflective of the strength of the conclusions.

We’re seeing a lot of debate in Washington about what is commonly referred to as the "national debt ceiling." This post is an attempt to shed some light – and provide some good resources for further information – on what this really means. National debt is not the total future obligations of the federal government to pay. It is basically all the public debt (like Treasury bills) plus money we owe to other governments – in other words this ceiling only puts a limit on how much the federal government can borrow, not on how much they can spend.

The national debt number is available "to the penny" at the Treasury Direct website. There are only a few categories of debt that are not subject to the limit, mostly having to do with the way that Treasury Bills are issued to pay all the interest up front (discounted) and the way that payment is handled in accounting terms. Raising the National Debt Ceiling involves raising the limit on the public debt ceiling.

There is a bigger number that most other countries use to define “debt”. The official definition for “debt” used in the European Union, for example, includes obligations to Social Security, Medicare, etc. at the national level, plus regional and local government debt. (Thanks to Yannick for initiating a discussion of the distinction with his comment to my 2009 piece on Public Debt Crisis.) In the U.S., the larger number is usually referred to as "total indebtedness". There is no limit set on the promises of the US government to spend money -- for example, the almost $13 trillion committed to the post-crisis bailouts and stimulus was not subject to the debt limit despite that number being almost equal to the total national debt. The limit only applies to how much the Treasury can borrow to meet its obligations. So if the question is “should the ceiling be raised?” then my answer is “it doesn't really matter.” Congress can keep spending without it.

When politicians say they are against raising the debt ceiling it’s usually referred to as “Grandstanding” – which Merriam-Webster explains is to act so as to impress onlookers.

Tuesday, the Houston Metropolitan Transit Authority (Metro) held a blogger luncheon with senior Metro people (Chairman, CEO, board members, managers) at the Rail Operations Center south of Reliant.  It was an informative event with a lot of good two-way Q&A.  And it included an impressive tour of the facility, which, btw, is not air conditioned in the main maintenance bay.  Let's just say it was the right time of year for a tour and I'm really glad I don't work there in the summer.  The facility is doing its job though: Metro claims to have the highest operational uptime for rail cars in the country.

Sometimes in my push for increasing commuter bus services and cutting back rail, I fail to give credit to a lot of good work that is going on at the "New Metro":
a few issues for our collective consideration:

They really are a lot more open and transparent, and are really trying to do the right things.  
There's been a lot to clean-up, and they've done a good job (although CEO Grenias says it will take another 2-3 years to completely turn around the organization).  
They've also done a good job continuing to reach out and create collaborative agreements to provide commuter bus services outside of their service area (like Baytown and Pearland).
They've fixed the poorly performing Airport Direct service, price and route-wise.
They shifted to a cash basis for the General Mobility Program instead of increasing debt.
They fixed their broken relationship with the FTA.

There was a lot of good talk about improving express commuter bus services to TMC, Greenway, and, most importantly, Uptown.  I pitched them on expanded HOV/HOT lanes (like the 610 Loop) and laptop trays and wifi on the commuter buses, which are under consideration.  They have a very high percentage of downtown commuters - 30-40% - and claim a pretty high number for TMC - 20-30% - but that includes people who park in Smithlands and ride the rail, which I don't consider a true commuter solution (it's not doing anything to reduce freeway congestion).

Ultimately, they're trapped by the voter referendum and the federal money process to keep pursuing a rail plan (and line prioritization) that really doesn't make a lot of sense given the new fiscal reality since the referendum was passed.  It will make even less sense if the Republican House guts rail funding.  But at least they're taking steps to "firewall" the rail plan financially so it doesn't end up stealing from critical local and commuter bus operations.  I may not agree with the overall strategic direction of the agency, but they do have good people doing good work within the constraints of the game they're forced to play.

This post originally appeared at houstonstrategies.com

The Bureau of the Census has just reported that the city of Chicago lost more than 200,000 people between 2000 and 2010. At 2,696,000, this takes Chicago to its lowest population since 1910, and nearly 1,000,000 fewer than its census population peak of 3,621,000 in 1950. In 1910, the city had a population of 2,185,000, and increased in 1920 to 2,702,000.

The Bureau of the Census had estimated Chicago's population at 2,851,000 in 2009, down from the 2000 census count of 2,897,000. Chicago is the seat of Cook County, which lost 180,000 between 2000 and 2010, though outside the city of Chicago, Cook County gained approximately 20,000 residents.

Paul Krugman really doesn’t like the possibility that there is a structural shift in employment, because it weakens the argument for the massive Keynesian spending spree he’d like to see the government initiate.  To that end, he published this piece on his blog February 13th.

Before we go on, some readers may wonder what a structural shift is and why it weakens the argument for Keynesian spending.  A structural shift is when employment permanently shifts (well, as much as anything is permanent in economics) from one economic sector to another, say from construction to healthcare.

The reason that a structural shift weakens the Keynesian’s argument is that moving workers from one sector to another takes time.  They may need retrained.  They may need to move to another location.  Think of our construction worker moving to health care.  He or she probably doesn’t have the skills to be immediately employable in health care.  Some sort of education or training has to happen first.

This poses a problem for Keynesian expansionists, because their argument is that the only problem is a drop in aggregate demand (consumer spending) brought about by….well, animal spirits.  Since there is no real problem, government can increase spending (it doesn’t matter what you spend the money on.  You could dig holes and fill them back up), fool the consumer into thinking she is better off, and voilá, aggregate demand goes up with the government spending.

Problem solved.  It’s a beautiful thing.

However, spending can’t solve the problem of unemployment brought about by a structural shift.  It takes time to retrain the affected workers.  There are things government can do to speed the process, but spending willy-nilly is not one of them.

Hope that clears things up.  Let’s get back to Krugman’s piece.

He claims that unemployment in every sector has just about doubled since the recession began, and that this is proof that no structural shift is going on.  He has a nice chart to show the increase in unemployment by sector.

There is a problem though.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics—the same source that Krugman claims originated his data—reports that construction jobs fell by 2 million, or 26.7 percent, from December 2007 through December 2010, while education and healthcare jobs grew by1.2 million, or 6.5 percent.

This appears to contradict Krugman’s data, but it is possible that both sets of data are true.  If they are both true, then Krugman is being no less dishonest than if he created his numbers out of thin air.
If Krugman is telling the truth when he presents a graph showing that unemployment approximately doubled from 2007 to 2010 in both the construction and the education and healthcare sector, then is must be that large numbers of unemployed construction workers migrated to being unemployed education and healthcare workers.

There is no other possible explanation.

This, of course, completely contradicts Krugman’s argument.  If his data are true, he’s using data that confirms a structural shift to argue that there is no structural shift, by neglecting to disclose the jobs data I’ve disclosed above.

Krugman is not a dumb guy.  He has a well-deserved Nobel Prize for his work on international economics.  He has a career of looking at data, in depth and with insight.  His failure to provide the entire story has to be considered something besides an oversight.  We have to conclude that he’s purposely being deceitful.

I don’t know why a guy with all of Krugman’s gifts and accomplishments would use data deceitfully.  It is a shame, though, that an economist at the top of his profession and with the New York Times bullhorn uses that bullhorn to confuse instead of to enlighten.

CensusScope’s dissimilarity index measures the distributions of blacks and whites across a city to quantify the level of integration and segregation. The site discerned three major Midwestern cities in the top ten: Detroit, MI in second; Milwaukee, WI in third; and Chicago, IL in fifth. These cities are major hubs for their region, both socially and economically. But does segregation affect quality of life? And does it help or hinder job growth?

In order to get a decent comparison between these segregated cities and their quality of life, it’s necessary to take into account three cities with relatively low segregation: Minneapolis at 107; Austin, TX at 179; and Madison, WI at 213.

To estimate quality of life, let’s look at three factors from the American Community Survey, 2009: Percentage of population with a Bachelor’s degree of higher; percentage of population considered unemployed; and percentage of families below the poverty level. Comparing the different values with their respective city produces an interesting result.

The cities with the most segregated neighborhoods tend to have a less-educated base, contain a higher amount of unemployed workforce, and also have more families below the poverty level. On the other hand, Madison, Minneapolis, and Austin all boast high levels of educational attainment, relatively low unemployment rates, and a smaller percentage of families living below the poverty level, although Austin comes close.

However, Madison and Austin are relatively smaller than the other areas listed here, and have prospering tech sectors and contain well-known universities that tend to dominate the city’s economy. With respect to this, segregation may not be a factor at all. Instead, the city’s development and more tech-oriented economies may be the answer.

From these results, one may be able to cite segregation as an obstruction to a strong quality of life. One variable that seems to stick out amongst the data is that of educational attainment. Does education reduce segregation, or does segregation impede education?>

It is always encouraging to see greater objectivity in the treatment of the suburbs. In fact, the urban form includes not only the urban core, but also the suburbs and economically connected rural areas and exurban areas that are beyond the urban footprint. This fact has often been missed by some urbanologists who imagine no city extends beyond the view on the foggiest day from a central city office tower.

William Upski Wimsatt, author of Bomb the Suburbs, has now published an update called Please Don't Bomb the Suburbs. The title of Wimsatt's original book, focusing on grafitti and hip-hop culture, has a ring reflective of the irrational and ideological condemnation that has been far too typical of some of the urban planning community.

Wimsatt cites five myths about suburbs in a Washington Post opinion piece. To be charitable, he gets as many as four of them right. These include his discovery that suburbs are not white middle-class enclaves, that they can be "cool," that they are not necessarily politically conservative, and that suburbanites care about the environment.

However, Wimsatt still has some distance to go. His last myth suggests that suburbs are not the result of the free market. This general proposition is tenable, for example, given large lot zoning requirements, which have caused many urban areas to consume far more land than they would have if the market had been allowed to operate. The problem with Wimsatt's free-market analysis is his acceptance of three additional myths.

Myth 1: Smart Growth Reduced Property Taxes in Portland: Wimsatt cites an analysis indicating that property taxes in Portland dropped between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s while property taxes in Atlanta increased. He uses this "factoid" to imply that Portland's more restrictive land use planning regime ("compact development" or "smart growth") is superior to the more liberal Atlanta approach. Wimsatt does not note that during this period the voters of Oregon implemented their own Proposition 13 type property tax reduction (Measure 5), which lowered property taxes even as per capita revenue rose at a greater rate in Oregon than in Georgia. To be fair, Wimsatt cannot be blamed for this oversight, since the Sierra Club source he cited omitted this detail. We refuted a larger analysis by Arthur C. (Chris) Nelson that included this claim 10 years ago, in a paper for the Georgia Public Policy Foundation entitled American Dream Boundaries: Urban Containment and its Consequences.

Myth 2: Suburban Infrastructure is More Costly: Wimsatt claims that the cost of infrastructure and public services is higher in suburbs than in the urban core. Joshua Utt and I put this myth to rest in research covering all of the reporting municipalities in the US government database, which indicated no such higher costs (The Costs of Sprawl: What the Data Really Show). The claims of higher infrastructure and service costs in the suburbs are largely based on theoretical studies, which invariably suffer from the "length of pipe" fallacy, which fails to take into consideration the substantial differences in the costs of infrastructure construction in already developed areas versus greenfield areas. In fact, labor costs tend to be less in suburban areas. Moreover, much of the cost of suburban development is paid for by home owners, who reimburse developers who have already paid much of the sewer, water and street construction costs. These are not costs to the public or to society, they are costs that buyers voluntarily pay for what they consider to be a better lifestyle. Finally, Core city infrastructure is often obsolete and not able to adequately serve the higher demand that would occur from substantial population increases.

Myth 3: Consolidating Local Government Saves Money: Wimsatt presumes that consolidation of local governments is a way to reduce public expenditures. He cites the case of towns in New Jersey, which he would prefer to see combined. Despite the fact that ivory tower before-the-fact analysis routinely concludes that larger, consolidated local governments are spend less per capita than smaller governments, the record says exactly the opposite. Our research, using US government, New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois state databases shows a consistent relationship between larger local governments and higher expenditures per capita and higher debt per capita.

This should not really be so surprising, since larger governments tend to be further from the people and by definition more remote from their control. Where voters are less important, as is the case with larger local governments, special interests fill the vacuum, generally to the detriment of taxpayers.

With this diluted control by voters, larger governments tend to get into financial difficulty, and a vicious cycle of excessive spending and debt can follow. Often unable to say no to spending interests, they raise taxes. When the electorate loses tolerance for higher taxes, larger governments tend to borrow, which increases expenditures even more. Finally, when they reach high debt levels, it is not unusual for there to be proposals to consolidate these governments with their smaller neighbors, which have been more fiscally prudent. If consolidation is implemented, the new larger local government is granted a new lease on fiscal irresponsibility, and per capita expenditures and debt is likely to rise even higher.

As if that were not enough, labor contracts and service levels are routinely "harmonized" at the highest cost, since employees will not be forced to take pay or benefit cuts and service levels will generally not be reduced for residents. This was cited by the Toronto Business Alliance after a theoretical $300 million in promised cost savings were transformed into substantially higher spending in the newly consolidated city.

Welcome: Wimsatt graciously ends his commentary by saying "Everyone with a prejudice against the suburbs will have to get over it. Even me." Welcome, Mr. Wimsatt.

The widely dispersed opposition to proposals for high speed rail (genuine and faux) led Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood to say that the Administration would press forward in a patchwork fashion if necessary.

"Patchwork" may be an overstatement. House Appropriations Committee Chairman Hal Rogers (R., Ky.) has plans to eliminate high speed rail funding in the current fiscal year. Already, holes have appeared in the high-speed rail plans with the cancellation of the Milwaukee to Madison line by Gov. Scott Walker and the cancellation of the Cincinnati to Cleveland line by Gov. John Kasich.

Should the Republican congressional high speed rail defunding proposal survive, it will could put an end to such proposals as the Miami to Orlando high-speed rail line, which has been advertised as an $8 billion project but which international experience suggests could easily reach $16 billion.

Further, the proposed defunding could render California's presently planned San Joaquin Valley "train to nowhere" (Corcoran to Borden, with stops in Hanford and Fresno) as less than patchwork. The California line was already on life support, with the newest estimates indicating a 50 percent cost increase over two years (to $65 billion), bringing overall per mile cost escalation since the initial 1999 estimate to approximately 100 percent (adjusted for inflation). As these difficulties were not enough, the Community Coalition on High Speed Rail reports that agricultural interests are now raising concerns about the impact of construct in the San Joaquin Valley. Strong citizen opposition has already developed on the San Francisco peninsula and in the Los Angeles area, which may have been part of the reason that the California High Speed Rail Authority chose the "train to nowhere" route as its first segment.

This could also make it unlikely that there will be any new funding for the Chicago to St. Louis high-speed rail line, which requires at least another $2 billion to complete the trip in four hours (at an average speed of 75 miles per hour). In fact, four hour service was promised in the US Department of Transportation documentation that accompanied the previous $1 billion grant.

It will probably also be the end of the $12 billion (more likely $25 billion) proposal to scrap the 75 mile per hour Chicago to St. Louis system after it is completed and replace it with a completely new, faster line that would travel twice as fast.

A number of commentators (including this author) have suggested that zeroing out high-speed rail is a litmus test of the resolve of Congress to control spending. The first steps may have been taken.

There have been reports for some years about the Volkswagen 1-litre car, so called because it would travel 100 kilometers on one litre of fuel. That is the equivalent of 235 miles per gallon. Earlier reports were that the car would be marketed by now.

Now Volkswagen indicates that the car will be produced "within the next few years." The car will be called the XL1. However, rather than being a 1 L car it will be a 0.9 L car, achieving 261 miles per gallon. The improvement is the result of adding an electric motor that will make the car a plug-in hybrid.

This is just further indication of reality that technological improvements can materially reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, if the entire automobile fleet could obtain this fuel efficiency by 2050, greenhouse gas emissions from cars would be reduced more than 80 percent, despite substantial increases in driving. This development may mean that petroleum itself could emerge as a "green fuel."

Moreover, this advance is consistent with finding by McKinsey & Company and the Conference Board, in a report sponsored by the Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Shell, National Grid, DTE Energy and Honeywell that "....no change in thermostat settings or appliance use, no downsizing of vehicles, home or commercial space and traveling the same mileage” and no “shift to denser urban housing" would be necessary to achieve substantial greenhouse gas emission reductions in the United States.

Volkswagen L1 (2009) photo by RudolfSimon